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France is a small caldron In which the groat issues
of our time are being smelted and refined. The issues
are socialism from eastern Kurope and human liberty which
has its being chiefly in the Atlantic community. If France
succeeds in transfomlng these forces into a new and dynamic
doctrine, her achievement will help to stabilize the World.
If she fails, a bastion of freedom shall be lost; and the
democratic world will be less stable and the process of
the adjustment more painful and prolonged. Daily radio
broadcasts and news releases carry additional eYidences
of the ebb and flow of this process which holds world dip-
lomatic maneuvers and political temperaments on a razor's
edge. An understanding of the contributing forces will
do much to help allay \annecessary anxiety over destiny
shaking events.
%hen questions were raised in a Comparative Govern-
ment discussion over elements in the newly reorganised
French constitution i^ich could not be answered with a
feeling of certainty an excellent challenge was afforded
for a gradtiate problem. Initial research on the question
revealed such a rich field for further examination and study
that thesis possibilities were considered.
It is the purpose of this study to present a compact
analysis of the constitutional development in France from
the time of the decline in effectiveness of the constitution
AAA
Of the Third Republic until the adoption of the instru-
ment establishing the Fourth Republic. To do this it will
also he necessary to investigate and analyze the philos-
ophical end idealogieal changes and developments in order
to understand their ramifications in the final document.
It is hoped that such a study and evaluation will help
give some coherence to events as they ooour in Prance to
the total world pioture.
Acknowledgment for intei^ested and valuable advice^
information, time, service, and moral support is grate-
fully made to: Dr. A. Bower Sageser, graduate advisor;
Mr. I. V. lies, professor of Comparative Government; the
staff of the department of History and Government at iCanaas
State College, who so willingly gave advice and encourage-
ment; The French Embassy Information Service, for documen-
tary information; the Kansas State College Library force;
and all others who were so kind and helpful in many little
ways in making this study a reality.
CH;.PTEft I
THE DECLIKE OP THE THISD REPUBLIC
In 1946 Prance had had more axperienca at drafting
and adopting constitutions than had any other European
people f Between 1789 and Jiwe 1940 she had no fewer than
seven constitutions, each of which, with the exception of
the one in 1875, vaa believed by its framers to be a move-
ment of construct ive statesmanship and worthy of a long
life* The five documents comprising the constitutional
foundation of the First Kepublic were a direct outgrowth
of the popular demand for changes in the entire social
structure of Prance. Each of these instioiments elaborated
the previous constitutional document after the duration of
only a few years. Government under each of these instzni-
ments was unsatisfactory because of incompetent leadership
to pat the wishes of dominant political groups into practice,
The Second Republic attempted to secure more competent
leadership for the political aspirations of various groups
following an Interim of absolutism and monarchy. The con-
stituent convention provided a scheme of government that
was simplicity Itself. Franco was to have a president dir-
ectly elected for a four-year term aided by an elective
parliament with a single chamber. But again for lack of
sufficiently competent leadership the Kepublic was replaced
by monso^chy and absolutism.
Out of the defeat in the Franco-Prussian ..ar which
was the culmination of tha absolutist regime there grew
up an elected National Assembly with ill-defined powers to
pass on terms of peace with Oeznnany. Since power was so
poorly defined and the emergency was acute ths group assumed
imlimited leadership* This assembly produced three acts
which became the fundamental legal basis for the Third He*
public. This basis was more fragmentary than comprehensive,
but it endiired because no system of political philosophy
was embodied in it.
The legal basis of the Third Republic covered only
the method of selecting the members of the Itational legis-
lature, the executive power, and the organization of the
Senate. Amendment was provided for by a vote of the Aatlcn al
Assembly. Under such a broad flexible system many errors
In administration and governmental functioning could and
did occur. Many Frenchmen felt that the evils were the
result of the difficult living conditions of the time which
had a tendency to Intensify the y/eaknesses in the consti-
tutional system.
Three main defects were early dlscernable and they
quickly became mors complex and involved as administration
intensified them. Such a broad flexible system gave much
room for individualism on the part of elected and appointed
officials in the exercise of their duties. This tendency
was greatly augmented by the absence of a strong two-party
system which might check radical departures from the orth-
odox in policy. So coupled, these conditions made for
grave Instability of the executive position, which caused
many to fear collapse of the entire governmental structure
during its entire life-
Shifty cabinets, generally taken as a symbol of par*
liaaentary chaos and dry rot, were offset to a large extent
by the extreme stability of the administration. Civil
servants were responsible for the length of life accredited
to the Third Republic. They were the great mass of the
bureaucracy from the undersecretaries of ministry down to
the lowliest officials who devoted a lifetime to public
office. In practice these people made all decisions ex-
cept the political ones.^ This had a tendency to exercise
a strongly conservative influence on National politics.
As in Germany before 1918, the collapse of the Third
Republic appears much more as a breakdown of the military
caste, dragging down with it the morale of the nation than
as a result of the inadequacy of constitutional arrange-
ments. France went through a period of acute internal
crisis between iC.orld Vlfar I and fcorld i«iar II, She developed
an unhealthy mental reaction to domestic problems and world
affairs as she began to experience a sense of frustration
In accomplishing recor struction and a position in post-war
Europe, lliefirst fundamental principle of her foreign
policy, eastern alliances, had disappeared along vilth the
^Approximately a half
-million candidates for positions were
subjected to strict competitive examinations.
second principle, reBseurance In the veat. %hat balance of
political Btability had been achieved quickly vanished when
the army began to sense that all effort or sacrifice would
be useless in another war which was surely coming. Previous-
ly, the French squabbled over their domestic affairs, but
unity would be automatically and immediately restored the
moment there was a threat from the outside. In June 1940,
this automatic regulation no longer oporated. It was with
ill-conoealtfd reluuta^ce that, following ths British lead,
war was declared on Germany, \iith an equal degree of reluc-
tance and an unhealthy attitude of "defeatism" the war was
promoted. Small wonder that in June 1940 France collapsed
J
The French defeated themselves. What happened was th«
logical consequence of French history. Among the many con-
flicting views expressed coneeniing the fall of the Third
Republic, a few substantial causes for its failure can be
discerned. The Preach were the victims of a new type of
mechanized warfare of such a nature that the defensive pre-
parations of the Maginot Line proved inadequate. Political
leadership in the Third Republic was corrupt and weak. Too
long had the I'Venoh been tolerant of bureaucratic, slothful,
and ineffective leadership, ivhan France adopted the author-
itarian form of government which was centered In Vichy no
fascist mass party, which today is the indispensable pre-
requisite of popular upheavals, was in existence. It was
a coup d^etat from above, a deliberate act of the defeated
military leaders and their political advisers - in short a
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^aeraan Beukema. Contemporary Foreign Qovernaientw fHaw Moyif,
1946) , 66. '
skillfully engineered political stratagem.
The new govomment which was established was, accord-
ing to George Solovaytchik, writing in the Annals of the
American .icade.-ny of Political and Social Science > "composed
partly of political perverts and adventurers, partly of
paid traitors, and partly of honest but misguided men who
thought they could do no better because the struggle against
Oermany had come to au end." For the first two and a half
yaurs of its exi3fc«»no<p the Vichy Government followed a policy
which fluctuated botwoen subaervldnco to Germany and soml-
indepondeno3 based on Germany's Increasing difficulties on
the battle fronts. The basis of its power both internal
and international was fourfold. The control of the t'rench
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Ariay was retained as was that of tho Mediterranean fleet.
AdMlnistration of the unoccupied southsrn zone gave Vichy
officials some opportunity for precarious and spasmodic free-
dom of action. These powers plus the person of Petain, who
was the rallying point for popular confidence gave onough
prestige to the government to make it at least the de-facto
government of imoccupied ^''rance.
The de-facto government promulgated various reforms in
an attempt to moat some of tho evils of the Third Republic.
An authoritarian adtninistpation was established to replace
representative govarnmout by giving the legislative constit-
•tOeorge Soloveytchik, *'^ome Permanent Aspects of i'renoh r*ol-
icy," Annals of tha .wm^irican /vcademy of ?rtlitical and SodLal
Science
.
234:64-60 (July, 194471
^The ''/j?mistice Army" was composed of 100,000 men. See David
Thomson, "Storm Clouds over France," Contemporary Review,
165:145-51 (March, 1944). '
uent power to the cabinet. The cabinet itself was revised
so that only ten agencies dealt with the domestic and for-
eign problems of the government. To enforce the a^lnls-
trative decrees the ciTll service ratings were withheld
from all applicants and given only sparingly to these of
established French l.atioiiality. All coauaunal and mvinicipally
elected councils of more than 2,000 oienibers were abolished
in order to give the positions to govemitent appointed mem-
bers.
As the people began to rocovo-r from the stunning blows
of constitutionally adciristered reforms, they realized that
the war was still going on toid that there was no basis for
so close a collaboration \f.ith Geririany; a collaboration which
demanded a submission of deeply revered and strongly rooted
liberties to a hated authoritarian conquoror. They began
to organize resistance. The chaiiges in France following
the armistice in Jxme 1940 can be suuuaarized roughly as
follows: 1940, stupor; 1941, uncertainty and resignation;
1942, disilluaionLient; and 1943, revolt.
The resistance movement served as a transformation of
healthy plasma to a dying f'rance. Secretly and slowly
new streijgth and energy flowed into the veins df former
basic ideals and forces in j'r-enoh life, rtapldly the old
automatic transition to unity took place in the shadows
of the Vichy regime. In the shadows was effected what had
been impossible In the bright light of liberty and freedom.
A member of the underground expressed the attitude of the
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Pronch people very aptly by saying that never were they freer
than under the German ocouoatlon. The more the i»asi venom
crept into their thoughts the more each precise thought be-
came a conquest. Thus in blood and shadovfs a republic
erected Itself; perhaps the strongest of reoubllcs yet known
for the French.
The newly erected reoublic, exi'^ting in the fear of
momentary extinction by Vichy or Ogrraany if it be discor-wed,
aaavuaed the guise of the F.P.I.^ with ill-defined Iftader-
ship. The closest form of leadership which could be rec-
ognized for the embryo state was In the form of one of two
men; Henri Oiraud, the Commander of Colonial forces in
Morth Africa; or Charles deOaulle, the organizer of the
underground of occupied France.
Gradually daGaulle struck the popular imagination as
a great hero in France »8 fight for freedom, end be quickly
gained popular favor. To the people, he was a near-mystic
figure in the crusade against the forces of evil. DeOaulle,
however, was not a mystic figure; but a person of great
practical mental capacities. He had long tried in vain to
persuade Prance to scrap the antiquated theories of warfare
then being applied. For twenty years, in lectures, magazine
articles, and in his book. Toward the Career Araqr, he had
urged the creation of a motorized and armored force. He
Ijeaa Paul Hartre, "Paris Alive, The Republic of Silence,"
Atlantic Monthly
. 174:39-40 (December, 1944).
i*lVenoh Forces of the Interior.
actually prophesied that the future professional army would
roll entirely on caterpillars.-^ Immediately upon the col-
lapse of Prance he recognized the need for strong leader-
ship and orgerilzation which ciight doiiiand the support of
the French populace In opposition to Vichy and at the sem«
time provide a fremework to orystallze the soluble republic
of the F.P.I, This he eococipllshed in London v.here he had
escaped at the timc; of France's capitulation. His famous
clarion call for rcelatance, "France has lost a battle but
she has not lost the war," vas his point of departure. A»
support for the eoveaent grow end acts of resistance be-
came more frequent and effective deQaulle made longer rang*
plans for the ostabllshrcent of a Fourth uepublio in France.
To fulfill these plana deGaulle moved in 1943 to Algiera
to work with the French GrOTernment already located there.
Although no French Colony was self-govarning, certain
colonies such as Algiers were treated a« integral parts
of Prance. French colonists and citizens. Including cer-
tain categories of niitives within them, were privileged to
elect representatives to the French Papliament. For local
governmentEl purposes the so areas were organized into de-
partments and govomed according to the pattern established
in Prance. Algeria was completely unlike "uropeen Pr&nce,
however, in that it had not exporiei^ced invasion, its food
restrictions wore more bearable and the Vlohy dictatorship
was milder in character. In such a situation It was easy
J
^Aewsweek
. 15;20 (June 17. 1^40^ *~~~
to find the core for a government- In-oxlle wben Germany
began to deny Vichy more and more power. The French setU er«
In Algeria favored resistance to the Nazis > but they were
far from supporting deGaulle. The same mood prevailed In
the army and navy.
Admiral Darlan, a Vlchlte head of the French Army,
headed the North African government from i^ovember 11, 1942
until his assassination on December 24, 1942. He pledged
full support to the United JNatlon»8 cause end became High
Commissioner of the French government-ln-exlle in Africa
under their authority. He created the Imperial Ooimcil of
French iifrica as his advisory body. Upon his death. General
Giraud, a French officer *ho had recently escaped from a
German fortress T^here ho had been held as a prisoner-of-war,
was elected his successor. As such, Giraud held the position
from December 27, 1942 until June 3, 1943.
DeGaulle feared the consequences In the future govern-
ment of Prance If the supporters of Vichy remained in con-
trol in the governmsnt in Algiers. On bastile Day, July 14,
1943, in line with his long range policy he Issued an appeal
to the general mass of the i^rench people to transfer their
support from the exiled government to the Oommittee of
National Liberation.^ This committee would serve as the
trustee of France which would be the means of securing the
Fourth hepublic of the P'uture.
^Hereafter referred to as the C.K.L.
In the declaration of intent for such an organization
it was stated that power would be siirrendered to a provision-
al French government at the earliest possible moment, pre-
sumably as soon as all or the greater part of French ter-
ritory was liberated. In the meantime the C.N.L. was to
constitute a directing committee of people who would be
in charge of various services. Also it was to form a larger
oounoil than in the Vichy controlled government-ln-exlle,
where distinguished or representative Frenchmen would be
able to deliberate on French affairs and give advice to
the administration*
Many conflicting points of view as to the composltloi
of the administrative orgariizatlon of the v^.K^^. beset
deQaulle as he attempted to put functional teeth into his
program. There were three forces which vied for acceptance;
parliamentarians; those who felt France should be made
unified through her governmental executive; and those who
strongly supported the interests of Oiraud. After muoh
compromising the committee's executive consisted of an
executive con}mi88lon of seven members with the two generals,
Qiraud and deCraulle, sharing the presidency. From the ap-
pointments of this executive arrangemant came the cabinet
members who by cooler headed actions maintained a balance
between governmental policies and the hot-headed quarreling
generals.
J-Henrl Glraud, Charlss daGsulls, General G«org.-5 G<,troux, Jean
gMonnet, Gonaral Alphonsa Georges, Rene Maseig11, Andre Philip.
^SDeolally was balance nalntalned by the efforts of Catroixx
and lionnet.
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Tho cabinet was made aware of the wishes and desires
of the supporters of the C,K.I», by means of the Consultative
Assembly. This assembly served as a sounding board for as
much public opinion as was available. Still it was some-
thing different from a single consultative body for it leg-
islated as well as offered suggestions. Hence, in effect
a new parliamentary form was bom. Certainly it was rep-
resentative of occupied France • 8 opinion for 46 out of its
100 members had left Prance in October and **ovember of 1943,
delegated by the resistance and the other political parties
to represent them. From the maze of undergrcHind resistance
arose several well-knit, capably managed organisiatiuns. The
most Important of these were: The iiational Front, uiade tp
largely of Cojorjunists; The i,ational -liberation ytPveraent, a
federation of people oi divergent political tendencies; and
a half dozen or so secondary groups including those called
Liberation Combat, Lioeration i<orth, and Civil and -illtary
Organizations. Consumation of unity in the aaseubly so
constituted was retarded for man^ months because of deep
idealogical differences and personal rivalry oetween Qiraud
and deGaulle.
Once tills group became the head of the govermuent of
Prance, it acted quickly. Three acts follovred each other
in rapid succession. First the French iimpiz^e was pledged
to fight until there should be unconditional surrender of
all the Axis powers. Then the people were again reassaz*ed
that the C.ii.L. would surrender power as soon as liberation
of the ^tropolltan territory would permit, at the latest
at the time of total liberation of Prance. And finally
the United States and Britain were foinnally notified of the
existence of the C.M.L. But under the surface of the
brilliant start dissent ion and lack of harmony were becoming
evident, Qlraud had presided over the sessicai of the assembly
Independently of deGaulle after deOaulle had expressly stated
that for the best interests of everyone they both should
preside. A second snag was struck shortly after the opening
of the session which brought the undercurrent of disccaitent
bubbling forth into a fountsiin of coriflict. ;.hen It vaa
•uggested that a purge be made of all Viohites, Oiraud
seriously objected on the grounds that tne C.i^.L. could take
no such action. Th^c In rapid succession deGaulle demanded
in addition to support of the proposal tnat the C.^*.^. be
wholly civilian; a largor executive group with virtually
a full-fledged cabinet; a stronger stench representation
in Allied councils be maintained to defend sovereign French
rights abroad; and till Vichy legislation in liberated French
territory be annulled.-^
The spirit of the new regime fthich the B'rench people
were seeking In their liberation has been defined by the
Paris paper, Le Populaire
. in the following way;
Like aLiioat tha entire nation we want an
honest regime, at once strong and democratic,
resting firmly on uriivei'siil sul'frage and—
•
while respecting and promoting human freedora
^Newsweek, CI: 63 f Jv:no Ki, 1945)
and dignity—-firmly resolTed to brush aside
everything that is opposed to the interests
of the comiHunity.^
The maintenance, in the face of popular sentiment, of
the Vichy order of things rather than the institution of
the pure republican form government seemed to be the crux
of the dispute between Giraud and deGaulle. As long as
the conflict was unresolved the claimants to supersede
Vichy's authority were twofold, the con8ei*vative Oiraud-
ists and the revolutionary deQaullists. DeGaulle wanted
not only to liberate but also to "renovate". He called for
new men and new methods of governiaant. He wanted xore than
a Fourth Republic, ha wantad one that would jyork. In other
words, he wejited both a political and an econojiic revolu-
tion and a transfer of poAsr, but the Gaullists were the
most dynamic in tirglng a change In the constitutional form
of government, ifiithout defining it, they wanted a political
revolution with a strong central authority, supported accord-
ing to the Hesistance organization by a single party.
The issue turned on the queeticn, «;hether France will
face the future, as Giraud would have it, on the foundations
which proved too ¥«eak to stand the strain of crushing social
problems, or v/hether it ihould accept ae reel the forced
liquidation of ancient internal hatreds and confront tlM
future with new men freeh ideas and iiiore solid bases. Soms
attempt was uade by the C.I..Lc to cocpromise the problem
^David iTiomaon, "The Fourth Republic." Contemporary Review.
16G:199 (October, 1S44).
by a reorganization which might make the administration re-
flect more adequately the political composition of France.!
Still the conflict was not reconciled, Oiraud who was
deeply interested in the welfare of France, rather than
sacrifice unity, withdraw into the background of official
activity. The resignation symbolized the strength of the
democratic idea within the committee, and a new begirming
in French politics.
DeQaulle might have been challenged in his position aa
leader, if the resistance had set up in the Consultative
Assembly a group who were prone later to break away and
take over the control of post-war politics. But they were
more concerned with keeping their best men in the under-
ground where they might be more useful. Hence deUaulle
remained vmchallenged iintil after the first iiatlonal elec-
tion in October 1945. l^challenged; in France, but among
the Allies favor for deOaulle and his actions did not reach
the high point that it did in France.
In i:«igland and the United States, the idea progressively
gained ground that deGaulle without the knowledge of the
French people had developed a "dictatorial complex." But
opposition to deGaulle was not motivated by the Allied re-
gard for the democratic wishes of tiie French people. No
such concern had been shown in Italy, Spain, or Poland,
rather France was to be held to a second class position to
•^Structure of the r«-''ls«d axecutl-ro of ^he O.K.^. : 5 Par-
1 lament ariana, 2 Socialists, 2 Rudloals, 1 Moderate, 4
reoresentinp resistance aovanerits , 3 supporting deOf^ulle
from the beginning, and 2 designated by Giraud.
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chack any tendency for social and economic changes de-
rranded by deGaullo blocking the conserrative British system
in western and southern Europe. Probably the Waited States
•
support for the advancement of any British policy which
might serve as a buffer between the problems of Europe and
the United States combined with the deep personal imoompat-
ibility of deOaulle and Franklin Roosevelt played a large
part in the diplomatic deadlock over recognition of the
In 1942 a United States memo to deOaulle did accord
recognition to his governaent as a military organisation
but not as the de-facto government, by stating:
The go^-ernment of the United States recogjiizes
the contributions of deOaulle and the work of the
French Kational Coianiitteo in keeping blive the
spirit of French traditions and institutions and
believes that the military aiias uecessury i'or an
effective prosecution of the war and hence the
realisation of our combined aims are the best ad-
vanced by lending all possible military assistano*
and support to the Irench i^ational uommittee as a
symbol of French resistance in general against the
Axis Powers ...
The government of the United States whole-
heartedly agrees with the views of the British
gcverni:.ent, which is also known to be the view of
the French national Committee, that the destiny
and political orgai-izatlor. of i'rance must in the
last analysis, be determined by free expression of
the French people under conditions giving them
freedom to express their designs unswayed by any
forci of coercion.-^
Kot all of deGeulle's efforts for more pentanent rec-
ognition t.ere completely fruitless, hoi^ever, for tentative
recognition of the C.I..L. was given by Great Britain and
Iq. E. Black, "Now Fighting Frt.nce,'' Current History. MS.
c:*« u^ept«ii,l»^r, 1942). *•
th« United States at the Conference of i^uebec in August
of 1943.
Still in quest of more complete reco^ition deGaulle
went to Moscow in November 1943 for talks with Joseph
Stalin. The discussions which took place there were secret,
but upon his return to Algiers deOaulle completely reorgan-
ized the C.Ii.L. forcing Oiraud entirely out of his position
In the Consultative assembly to which he had retired upon
resignation from the presidency. Some well-known parliamen-
tarians who had been formerly excluded were then included.
This act was undoubtedly in coiapliance v«ith commitments
aiade in iioscov.' or with the new ideas of political philosophy
gained from the Russian system.
The gravitation toward iiussia had a simple basis.
Stalin had never shown any inclination to aiminish i-rench
sovereignty. On the contrary he had been moat urgent in
wishing its re
-establishment and in recognizing the Algiers
government us the authority qualified to preserve it. In
spite of the movement towards nussia the other Allies did
not grant complete recognition.
£ven partial recognition on the part of some of the
Allies strengthened by complete Russian support was 9nough
to give a new feeling of dncouragement to deGavlle. In
the light of the reorganization in the administration the
Consultative assembly used the term provisional government
in presenting the president of the C.«.L. So enthusiasti-
cally was the title received that Immediately deGaulle was
advised to rename the Committee. H© did, on the same day,
indicating that for convenience sake it would go into ef-
fect June 2 of the same year.
The change In name had brox;^ht about the ho « on the
part of deCaulle that he might continue to govern France
during the interim oetween liberation and the elections,
but the Allies had conslstontly during the Geruan occupation
favored either Vicixy or Giraud. -veu ut the time of liber-
ation they v.ere st.lll reluctunt to grar^t iHJCCg::itlcn to
deUaulle.
ks the liberating armies moved into Prance, utter
confusion reigned concerning sovereignty. *^Gaulle had
visited Dtormandy prior to the invasion, at »hich time he
appointed representatives to take ciiarge when liberation
occurred* In place of these authorities assuming res-
ponsibilities for administration the ixilies had planned for
military men assigned by General Dwight l.iseniiower to fit
into civil administrative positions immediately upon liber-
ation. DeGaulle objected so seriously to this that for the
sake of unity Allied officials allowed him to address the
people of r ranee immediately following a statement of Allied
governmental policy given by Eisenhower. The net result
vas confusion.
In an attempt to relieve the confusion deGaulle was
invited to discuss the questions with Koosevelt. At that
time an accord was effected wnlch was worked out in detail
by Allied and i-'renoh experts. Still the chief stumbling
block lay in the contention that the consultative Assembly
was not representative, Ite general acceptance by the
French people hcwever was above questioning. The Council
of Ministers had changed much in composition from the first
days of the C.K.L. , elrays to include irxtre and more metuher a
of the resistance groups. It ruled by ordinances end de-
crees based broadly upon the lefts of the Third ilepublic
with sanction from the various I'eslstance groups, foriLer
political parties, and ths great trade unions as sell as
delegetos rx-onj uveiseas poast aaltJi'S. It fai-tiici iunctloned
linder a solumii proiuiee to convoke a Conctltuent Kijssmbly
as soon as possible. In ths face of such conditioris the
Cig Tliree finally granted complete recogcltion on October
23, 1944.
Even with recognition France found it difficult to
get along smoothly with her allies. She tas more interested
in her own governmental affairs than in those affecting
some remote Kation or group of l^ationa. On November 20,
1944, the Consultative Assembly met in Paris for the first
time and the people settled do*n to a period of constructive
government building.
ioae deQaulie^s "Government of the itepubllc" speech given
a2«m\i ""f""^^.?!^!^ -^s^^ly ^ ^aris on Seotember 13, 1944,Available in ntal Speeches
. 11:73-75 (hovember 16, 1944)!
CHAPTER II
THE PERIOD OP THE PROVISIONAL G0VKRBM3IT
Liberation of French territory by the combined efforts
of the Allies and the P.P.I, brought a wave of wild optimism
to the French people. They not only hoped an opportunity
had presented itself which would enable them to establish
a stable government but also to rebuild their calorie de-
ficient diet, their mine and rubble infested land, their
bOQib-racked homes, and their war-shattered family end
social llfo. UhQii it bacuao clear that the Battle for
Germany would continue during the winter of 1944-45 the
sense of axpectutiou and hope gave way to uneasiness. It
was in triie atuioaphere of gi-owing anxiety that the x'rovision-
al Government of the French Republic, formed by General
deGaullo, took office on iieptember 9, 1944.
Even as eurly as the days of nlgiers, deOaulle had
won the adherence of the Franch masses because, without
menticniiig the word "revolution,' he nevertheless rep-
resented a revolutionary idea. The program which united
Communists, radicals. Socialists, Christian Democrats, Re-
sistance delegates, and the O.O.T.^ in the Assembly and in
the reconstituted committee of April 1 (The Government of
RasMmblement National) was revolutionary. "Against col-
laborators and trusts J" meant that liberation would be
^Confederation Generale du Trqvail.
accompanied by the transfer of potver from the dominant
classes, which Is the essence of any revolution. Before
1940, no i'rench Oovernment could function except by the
grace of the real holders of authority, the 200 barking.
Industrial and landboldlng families who, with trusts,
press, and an effective liaison with the Army ran the
country. Prance had rejected the leadership of the old
bourgeois parties because to them were assigned the histor-
ical responsibilities for Fascism, war, and national dis-
aster.
DeGaulle took office at the head of a nlneteen-aian
cabinet. Most of his ministers had held equivalent pos-
it lors in the C.K.L, in Algiers, but new naaes on the list
showed the influence of the forces of trench resistance.
Owing to the close contacts which the f-rovisicnal Govern-
ment kept v.ith the underground laaders the reestablishment
of author itJ in liberated French territory proceeded with
remarkable saiootmiess. The administrative positions were
Immediately given to the realsbance workers. For after
all, th^ people *ho stayed In France were the ones who
were eventually going to have the final voice in the Govsrn-
ment. They were going to take dictation from no one. On
the tfholo they knew iittlo of deUauile, his struggle with
Qiraud, or the intricaoiea of t'vB^ French polities. They
had nothing against him as a pi;,i^8on, but in order to make
good in France he had to satisfy them.
^Officially named commiaHicsrers ."
The i'rovlslonal Governnient thus established in Prano«
co'ild claim no electoral sanction but its general accep-
tance by the French people as a whole was not open to
serious doubt. The Ccancll of Ministers had changed much
In coscpositiOTi from the days of Algiers, with the tendency
always to Include a greater proportion of members from th*
resistance groups. It ruled by ordinance and decree, bas-
ing its authority broadly upon the laws of the Third Repub-
lic. The Consultative Assembly too had been reorganized
before it met in November of 1944 in its first session in
liberated i'rance. There %ere 10£ jseats in the original
organization which M^ere luter expanded to £48. Sanction
was received wherever it could be found from the support
of resistance grcups, foruier political parties^ trade
unions, and delegates from overseas territories. It con-
stfjitly functioned under & solesiai oath to convoke a con-
stituent assaubly as soon as the 2,000,000 to 3,000,000
Frenchaian held in Germany could return to make a National
election possible.^
•^-fiesistence members in h^etropolltan France 148
H'2sisti?nc2 x-i'^b^Ts frox ovvjrseas 23
Former Parliament members 60
(in proportion to party strength in the
Chamber of Deputies as of Sept. 3, 1939)
Repres3:ii:ati'''es Troia ovor3ai:.s tarritories 12
Time, 44:35 (November 20, 1944).
Srnest J. .Inapton, "Tha Balance ohoet in Prance,"
gurrent History . 8:230 (isuarch, 1945).
^Tlie "abaant oiiis" nuiabersd nsr.rly 3,000,000 prisoners proper,
conscripted workers, and political hostages.
755,000 in oer^aa oflags and stalags
225,000 captive soldiers supposedly traiiaformed
ill to i'reo men
600,000 drafted la bocars
000,000 daporsea on poixtical aud raolai. grounds
450,000 A.lsatians and i.orralners
plus casuals mid unrojeotad.
Hew York Times ^lagazine
. 9 (April 15, 1946).
President appointed
alected
Nk
20 Ministers
iieaponslble Responsible
liatlanal Conscituent Assembly
Male and Female Voters
Fig. 3, Structui'O of the Froviaional Govarnment
-t-BariLan beakema, rOritomporsry i-'oreign ftovernmentg (fiew
York, 1946) , 96.
In Its roactlon to the new government the Paris press
varied from enthusiastic to polite. The French people
ware still too absorbed in oollaborctionist hunts and pri-
vate squabbles to acclaim or attack it. Foreign reaction,
however, was most emphatic. Recognition was still with-
held by the majority of the allied power?, primarily be-
cause they felt the Assembly lacked sufficiunt ropresontatlon
of popular sentiment. After the Qovernaient had been In
operation for nearly a month the support of the prisoners
who began to arrive home in torx'enta rather than the ex-
pected rivulets, stimulateJ tha foreign powers to roviss
their approach and attitude. On October 26, 1944, the Big
Three officially recognized the international status of
the iVovisioiial Governmdnt, and on i.)ecember 10, 1944, Russia
signed a 20 year alliance with rrance,
s^uietly, as thoiigii there had been no long and terrible
Interruption, i''i*unce oegan her fii-st free electi«i campaign
in five years. xhrougixout the campaign it became evident
that most x renohuien did not want to return to the inept
rule of "professional politicians" in a government dominated
by a bicicering i'ariiament. Miring the long period of Its
existence, Vichy propaganaa was rejected by both the heart
and brain of the Oulk of the French people. Its effects
were telling in many ways. One of the direct results was
to convince the average f'renoiuuen that the Third Republic
had been rotten to the core and thet every individual assoo-
lated with it shoula be looked upon with suspicion, sua-
plclon of dishonesty or Inefficiency, or both. This was
r^de clear in the clandestine publications of the French
Underground during the period of occupation.
The word revolution ran throughout the publications
of the underground. But, the term was used in the sense
of a complete renovation rather than a systematic break
with the past. The French did not wish to break with
their past, rather they thought a return to the basic
traditions would be indispensible to the moral health of
the nation. The notion of liberty, iriiich Is founded on
faith in reason; of equality, which pra-supposes respect
for the individual; and of fraternity, which is but another
aspect of the French genius for the universal, were still
fundamental notions to the French. To them it seemed that
the Third Republic failed, not because it entertained such
ideas, but because it did not sufficiently cherish them.
Hence, the problem of reconstruction was first and fore-
most a moral problem.
1
A year and a half before liberation, the various pol-
itical and resistance groups had been more or less consol-
idated in the I^ational Council of rtesistance.^ In March
of 1944, this orgtJiizatiOK finally achieved a definite pro-
gram of action for the postwar period, known as the Resis-
tance Charter. In broad outline the charter called for
the continued unity of the resistance groups after llber-
f^^^tJ'J^^^^^* x^ls^as for u 1V9W i'rance, " New"rten,T^i^111:50 (September 11, U44). ' •*
ation in order to defend the political and eccmomlc In-
dependence of France; punishment of traitors who had active-
ly collaborated with the enemy; maintenance of the demo-
cratic freedom of press, conscience, and assembly; and
achievement of "In^ispensible reforms." The most important
feature of the charter was its insistence that, in the des-
perate situation in which France found itself, some form
of planned economy was needed. Specifically ir its short
term policy it asked for, first of all, e oolicy of nation-
alization which would include oonf iacatl -n of illicit for-
tunes «?ained either by unpatriotic collaboration or ohauvln-
istio crookedness, a linjlt on the sl^e of lawful fortunes,
and abolishment of trusts. Second, It asked tiiat all col-
laborators bo sought out and punished. Tliird, it was sug-
gested that to give the little fellow a chaiice a work's oo»-
ralttee be set uo to ^tudy and deal with his Droblems. And
fourth, tho program called for e renovation of tho army in
an attemot to check the recurrence of the situatioi. of June
1940. Plnnllr It nrooo^ed that u vote of no confidence cf
the cabinet be accornparled by the dissolution of the chamber
followed by a ner- election in order to .ut tr. end to the
parade of cabinets which had so long disgraced parliamen-
tary activity.^
But faced with the problom of ahanging from a des-
tructive to a constructive au.ltaa., th. resistance political
^iTlniired h, Hadsel. 'Vranoe mnn, hk^—t: r
r^
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groups disintegrated in their xxnity. After the i'rovisional
Consultativa Assembly convened at Paris it soon became clear
that a crucial question from the political viewpoint was
the ultimate status of the resistance groups* So completely
did they become morgei with longer established groups of
the former Third Hapu.bllc tliat they rapidly lost their
import Hnco a« sn agency of pjlitlcal Infltienoe. The parties
which appealed to the greatest number of reaisters ftere
those embodying socialism in one guise or another. Es-
pecially since it had become apparent that in order to
resume even a semblance of the former framework the future
must provide for some plan for submissirai of private in-
terests to public interests, prevention of tne exploitation
of the national assets for the benefit of the few, and th«
abolition of cartels,
DeOeulle clesrly recognized and included these new at-
titudes in his request on governmental action. In address-
ing the
.
onsultatlve Assembly in Peris on Jvierch 2, 1946,
he said that he believed there were three bese« upon which
Prance could and should build a new prosperity,- greater
and more rational production resulting from a frsnk assoc-
iation of all men, who in their various offices t?ouM cooper-
ate In 911 undertakings; state action which would be care-
ful not to crush the initiative of competition and Just
profit and at the same time hold the principle levers of
corBmand. The state alone should be qualified to act so
that the multiple component parts would form a whole, and
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would be Integrated with the whole of v. or Id economic develop-
ment. He further added that it was the State's prerogative
to Insure by itself the deveiopaant of the great sources
of energy: coal, electricity, petroleum, as well as the
principal means of transportation on wrhidi all else depends.
It was the State which must control credit in such a way
that it would be able to divert national economy toward
the vast investments which are needed for such develop-
iwnts, and to prevent groups of private interests from
opposing the general interests.-^
To put these new attitudes into admiristrative prac-
tice proved to be a gretter task than it appeared on the
sui'faoe. nujEber- of clashes in political viewpoints and
Ideals arose to complicate the matter of quickly re-estab-
lishing a workable foundption for the government. Thos*
who left Prance during the occupation were challenged by
those who had remained, as to the former's right to parti-
cipate actively in the government. Those who wished a
limited form of authoritarianism as the new governai«»ntttl
form were criticized by those who felt only a democratic
government with complete civil liberty for all would work;
while those who wanted lenient treatment of collaooration-
ists were severly antagonized by those demanding ruass
executions as the only just treatment. None of the groups
could arrive at a satisfactory agreement as to the mode
-'Vital S£eeche8, 11:35S-S2 (April 1, 1946)
of procadure to be followed in the national elections.
So^ae people, \*itn deGaulle as tne ir leader, were op-
posed to tUa la*s of 1375 becausa linoy felt that in order
to reaurraot Prance and safeguard her in a world txireatened
by new vioiaaitudoa ic ^as wise and neoedsary to establish
a presidential typa cf goveinriaant, i?h3 principal feature
or the prasidantiai rogiraa u.i it was understood in ii\irope
In general cunsistdd v/f a preaxuent chosen by an electoral
body larger toan Parliawent. I'he President in turn would
choose ministers responsible to him and would have the
recognized right to dissolve rarl lament for a direct appeal
to the people. Such a situation in Prance, however, could
lead only in the direction of despotism.
In the meantime, in place of parliamentary rule, until
the problem could be solved, deOaulle established a govern-
ment in Which the powers of the President and Premier were
coa.bined in the hands of the President of the Provisional
Government while parliamentary powers were severely limited
and placed in the Consultative
.Assembly's scope of influence.
As an aseptic start the Qaullist Government formally
ebollshed the Frenoh State of Petain. In law, it proclaimed,
the 'rhird itepubiic had never ceased to exist. To quiet
the clamor of the resistance movement for a bigger admin-
Istrative role, deG^ulle reshuffled his cabinet twice within
two weeks. And to curb the great man hunt sweeping the
country all rosisters still grouped in Independent bands
were asked to give up their arms. But all did not go well.
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The first political test camo almost imiMdlately whaa
many F.P.I. men objected to the disarciaiaent order. The
resistance counoll announced that in preference to for-
feiting thdir leftist organization they intended to arrang*
a idore active new i'l'each .4.riay» Opposition also i*oared its
head in deGaulle^s cabinet as two u^ocuaunist uidmOers openly
attacked the General with tlis ciaargo tjiat he was treating
tae resiKtaace aovotaert na a negiigiola quantity, other
prooloais, bringintj, thu party siiviaions in the nation to
the sui'face of tne political sceno, also .ere subject to
heated debates and near governmental collapse, 'ihe CG.T.,
with ^omaninist support, asiced for a flat 40 per cent wage
increase; tiiroughout i' ranee iri place or tne ioruer local-
scale plan then in use.
The first opportunity for the French voters to declare
their sympathies at the ballot box occurred April £9 and
tlay 13, 1945, when comniunul couriciis »vere elected. On
September 23 and ^10 of the same year cantonal elections
were held. Teoiporary local governmental organization*
had been established until elections could be held. The
laws of the Third Republic affecting the election of muni-
cipal and departrcental officials had been restored in 1946.
It iftas under these conditions that the voting tooic place.
These two elections, sacn requiring second ballotings to
determine final choices, did not clearly reveal political
alignments.^ l^cal personalities and issues were consid<r-
^o^»ign ^ov>ers (New York, 1947), 166":— "" ^ ^
able factors, and more than 20 parties put iorward llsta
of candidates. Nevertheless these elections had a consider*
able value, for after a political blacicout which had lasted
mora than four years actlvd campaigning stimulated Interest
In public affairs and gave leaders an opportunity to meet
the voters.
In October 1945 and In June and Hovambor 1946 national
elections were hell. Int3re::t in all contests was keen id th
30 par cant or more of the voters participatirg on each
occasion. A form of oroportlonal eleaticsi according to the
prlnclnles set forth In the Ordinance of August 17, 1945,
was uj«ed. It tried to do away with some of the ovlla as-
sociated T/lt>- *-^r^ system used by the Third neoublic. One
hundred three small constituencies were drawn up, each
with a minimum of two and a maxlmura of nine deputies, the
average being five. The voters in each department then oast
their ballot for the party llst^ which contained a candidate
for every seat. The utilization of unused votes through a
system of national pooling of remainders was ruled out.
Thus eaoh constituency elected the full number of deoutiea
allotted to It, using the rr.etnod of the highest average
resulting from successive divisions. 2 Fmil oarty control
J- scratln
-la ll.^teT
2See appendix A.
^rlo i:inaudl, Volltloal Changes in i-rance and Italy "
^?fo?^^??^5of?^ '^''^ Constitutional Deb«?e in FriAce "l<atlon. 161:231 (September 22. 1945), ^i-anc ,buck, o£. clt., 166.
Vfts Imposed by also ruling out preferential voting: can-
didates were to be elected rapidly in the order of their
inclusion In each list with the order dictated nearly
always by what the French like to call the "general staffs"
of the several parties. Clearly this system favored the
coxintry at the expense of urban centers, particularly the
laboring centers, for there were no up-to-date statistics
upon which to base the establishisent of the new depart-
ments. DeOaulle gave his support to the election of Oct-
ober 21, 1945, but the left offered opposition primarily
because they felt the electoral machinery gave the rural
voters greater voice*
In the electoral campaign public opinion was divided
between two opposing tendencies. The parties and "move-
ments" which arose in the resistance experience definitely
supported the concept of a single-all-powerful Constituent
Assembly to which the government should be entirely res-
ponsible* The Radical Socialists and sane of the Social-
ists on the other hand were equally opposed to such a sol-
ution. The dispute began the day deGaulle asserted that
a sovereign Constituent Assembly mi^t lead to dictator-
ship. He further complicated the issue by saying that
pending the formation of a new constitution the government
should not be answerable to the Assembly except in matters
having to do with the budget, military affairs, structural
changes, and the ratification of treaties. ^ Immediately
J-I^rederic i'ottecher, "The Constitutional Debate in i'rance."
Nation, 161:280 (September 22, 1945).
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a storm aross in vhloh the majority of delegataa in the
Consultative Assambly ranged themselves against deOaulle,
for they charged he had sacrificed the best interests of
Prance in the hope of securing personal power. An ultimate
compromise which submitted a dual referendum plus the
scrutin de liste to the Toters solved the crisis with little
damage to Prance's program of recovery and reconstruction:
1* Shall the newly elected Assembly draft a constitution
for the Fourth Republic? and 2. If so, shall the pro-
visional government of deGaulle continue to exercise full
power while the constitution is being drafted?
Much confusion resulted in the minds of the voters as
to the correct way of answering all the questions on the
ballot. There were 2,500 candidates for the 586 assembly
seats in addition to the dual referendum. At the polls,
however, men and women alike asserted by a resounding
•jority their support for a Constituent Assembly maoh to
the left^ in character which would draft a new constitution
and provide a speeded up program for socialistic reform.
In addition by not quite so large a majority, the strong
executive Interim government was also approved.
Soon after the liberation of Prance it became evident
that a change had come over the political thinking of the
people. They were more than ever wed to the principles of
self-government, but they were also keenly aware of the
•"See chart on page 35.
nted for meeting economic and social problems with a modem
system of government. This awareness led them to reject
the constitution of 1875. Kever had a bitterly contested
French election made a trio of rivals so happy as the Com-
munists, the Socialists, and the new Popular rtepublicans
when the returns were made known followtog the October
elections. Still it was surprising that the elections
passed off eo calmly and left the voters feeling so strong.
'Hie voters had been warned about so many things not to do
and they were advised as to the correct procedure in the
marking of the ballots.^
Certain important trends were clearly z*evealed in the
electitxis. First, the nation was overwhelmingly in favor
of breaking with the Third Republic. Kinety-six and four
tenths per cent of the voters favored a new constitution
while only 3.6 per cent requested retaining the one of
1875 with modifications. The party most closely associated
with the Third Republic, the Radical Socialists, with the
rightist Union Republlcain Democratique pooled only 45
seats out of the 522 in the Assembly. Second, majorities
slightly smaller tlian those favoring a new document wished
the transformt^tion to be under the direction of deOaulle.
l-13ecause so many voters were Inexperienced they were told
whet to do and what not to forget; to bring their elector »s
cards, their identity papers, and a fountain pen, or at
least a colored pencil for an ordinary pencil invalidated
the ballot. ^Riey were sternly warned not to drop ink spots,
not to dog-ear the ballot, tear it, crumple it, or even
smudge it.
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Third, even though doG^uIle was still a aynbol of national
unity a majority of the votora hold views wall to the left
of the i'rovislonal Government. *'ourth, three parties of
approximately the same strength and approximately the same
program of atruotural reform, divided between ths Communists,
Socialists, and the M.R.P.^ over three-fourths of the seats.
Although the new "Big Three" had similar programs for
economic and social reforms and were moved by the spirit
of the Resistance, It would be misleading to picture a
state of perfect harmony among them, li© laager in Prance
were there two blocs of opposing forces on economic issues.
But the accumulated grievances and philosophical differences
that create an atmosphere of mistrust still existed. Es-
sentially the left feared the dictatorship of one man; and
the right, the dictatorship of the working classes.
The Socialist party derived its greateit strength from
the working and lower middle class. They advocated a pro-
gram of socialization of key industries with a large sector
of productivity retained for free enterprise. In regard
to the Fourth Hepubllc they favored a strong, popularly
elected executive with a single-chambered parliament aided
and assisted by a consultative chamber of experts from
trade unions, business, and agricultural interests. In
the event of parliamentary lack of confidence in the govem-
»ent, they favored the British plan of dissolution of Par-
|:iee Appendix A.
^arti Hepublicain Populaire .
llament and the calling of a new election. In foreign af-
fairs they advocated democrat izatlou of all nations and an
alliance with Ore at Britain to create a better balance in
international affairs.
In the October 21 elections, the Communists emerged
as the largest single party when they obtained 151 of the
522 seats in the Assembly. Many of their popular votes
Game, however, not from general support of the party but
because many of their candidates had been rtin on other
party tickets. Their strength might be attributed partly
to the record of Communists elsewhere in the world and
partly to the revolutionary mood of many people of western
Europe during the post-war dislocation. On the constitution-
al issue they were in favor of continuing the strong assembly-
weak executive idea of the Third Republic. But a system
of checks and balances between branches of the government
was definitely not looked upon with favor. Broad control
of economic life and a Soviet alliance were remaining
strong planks in their platform.
The platform of the new M.R.P. , known as the Popular
Democratic or Social Catholic i'arty before the war, ap-
pealed much to the conservatives who feared the radical
l«ft-wing parties. The social and economic program was
similar to that of the Socialists but the approach to the
problems was tinged with a greater religious fervor. Otx
constitutional questions too the platforms were similar
except that the M.R.P. favored a two^chambeired parliament
with political power centered In the lover chamber as a
check on political emotionaliBia. DeOaulle, to them, was
the one who could accomplish the task of fulfilling the
program.
The results of the elections vera due not merely to
the working of the electoral law or to the presence of
temporary circumstances operating to the disadvantage of
the older traditional parties. The attempt to show that
a great difference is to be found between the French local
elections of September and the national elections of Oct-
ober does not seem to be based on a very strong foundation,
for in both elections slightly more than half of the votes
went to the two Marxist parties. The only significant dif-
ference is in the better showing of the Radical Socialists
in tha local elections. This was to be expected in contests
where personalities and concrete issues weighed more than
general principles. The pressure of national problems was
little felt, and the traditional strength of the Radical
Socialists asserted itself to some extent. 3ut the weak*
nesses of the older parties revealed themselves and new
movements proved their strength when the needs of the
country as a whole came to the front in October.
Despite the differences among the three major parties,
the Assembly elected deOaulle president of the new popularly
sanctioned Provisional Qovernment on November 13, 1946, ,«i th
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only cmo rightist d^legata abstaining* tftiltj, howeyer,
was 8hort*llT*d* On KovealMr 16 deGaulla returned ttas
xandato for tha presidency to the Assembly because there
had been an open clash with the Gotomunists over the appotit*
ment of the cabinet* Procedure in s^oointing the cabinet
had bogged down when the Communists had demanded the right
to hold one of three positions, foreign affairs, war, or
interior, and the right to name the members for the pos-
ition. DeGaulle opposed some of their platform planks and
refused to give in to any compromise solutions. Deadlock
•as the result. »ihen the assembly met again they voted
400 to 163 to renew the mandate to deOaulle. On November 23
he presented his legislative program to the Assembly. Tl»
broad questions were supported by all parties, out opposition
still lurked under the surface of apparent accord.
In spite of the discords much of value in terms of
long range plans in the field of economics was accomplished
by the Assembly, Early in December of 1945, a proposal
was accepted for the nationalization of French banks. Even
though all the banks were not included and credit was not
nationalized, the plan went farther than the government had
at first suggested. Later in i)ecember the Bretton v^oods
agreement was ratified raid the exchange value of the fr^no
wa» adjusted. A Planning Council for !:odernization and
Re-equipment was appointed on January 3, 1946, to coordin-
ate plana for improving equipment and technical methods
employed in agriculture.
In the political realm, the iBuaediate task of tbs
Provisional Government was the maintenance of at least a
semblance of national unity because party conflict could
sap the strength of the iiapoverished country as it tackled
the problems of reconstruction. In one respect this task
appeared relatively simple, because the right wing groups
and leaders who^e stock-in-trade during the occupation
had been in collaboration with Vichy had either gone to
Germany or done their best to fade out of the political
picture. If deOaulle*s govewiment had been successful in
handling the concrete problems of reconstruction it might
have been able to check the growing cleavage between tl»
BI.R.F. and the Comraiznists. But economic recovery did not
progress far enough or rapidly enough to satisfy the nation's
^
basic needs and halt the inflation which had already begun
under occupation. Despite the avowed non-political char-
acter of deGaulle's cabinet it supported relatively conser-
vative policies on neurly every important political question
that arose during the first year after liberation, 1 Among
the decisions of the i?rovislonal Government which precipi-
tated the opposition were those concerning the i*',F.I, and
the purge of the collaborationists. Gradually the P.F.I,
had become merged with the regular army and deGaulle in
his eagerness to restore order felt that by-gones should
•^Winifred K. Hadsel, "France Since Liberation." Porel^
Policy Reports
.
22:28-9 (April 15, 1946). For additional
information on accomplishments of the Constituent Assembly
see Appendix B.
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be by-gones and this purges b« stopped.
DeOaulle^s xinwlllingness to go beyond llxalted reformi
may be explained by a number of factors. Juring tho first
year following liberation his primary concern was with
I^ance*8 diplomatic poaition and securing a definite man-
date from the people. Technical problems such as insuf-
ficient statistics, econojulsts, and an iinwieldly bureau-
cracy also checked reform. But the main reason for non-
realization of the goals In the Heslstance Charter was the
personal opposition of deGaulle to changes which might hav«
had far-reaching social Implications or have destroyed
property rights.
Kore Important however, as a function of the Assembly,
rather than the program of r«con"=>truction and recovery
was the mandate from the people to form the constitution
for the Fourth Republic. As the 42 members of the Constit-
utional Commission, chosen by the Assembly from among the
various parties on the basis of their electoral strength,
began to work on the prelluilnary draft of a new constitution
the same political struggles that were talcing place on the
floor of the Assembly were being duplicated behind the
closed doors of the comtalBslon,
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST OONSTITUTIOKAL DRAFT ASD ITS REJECTICK
In th« canpaign prior to the •lection of October 21,
1945, the constitutional mandate was mantloned only in
general terms. It would appear that in turning thair baoka
on the past by demanding something new the French generally
reacted against the terrible defeat of the Third Republic
and were thinking more In terms of morality, social refojna,
and economics than in terras of a particular law. The only
limitations imposed upon the Assembly's power to draft the
constitution were those of the seven month's duration of
the Assembly itsolf, and the proviso that the governmdnt
might demand the reconsideration of any decision the govern-
ment might make. But, because the attitude in the Assembly
was that it had been born to set right every wrong, to re-
form all errors, and to Inaugurate a brave new world, con-
st 1tut lon-maiclng was relegated to the backstage until the
last few weeks of the Assembly's life. ¥,anj hoped that
by outting off until the last minute the actual drafting
of the constitution, which would be the fourteenth since
1791, the problem of securing a less volatile government
and at the flame time that of preserving dearly won individ-
ual liberties could be met more easily.
The actual work on the draft in the last few months
of the Assembly's duratlai was done by a speclhl forty-two
man commission working In sessions closed to the repre-
sontatlvas of the prets and members of the govarniaent.
Hence thare was no official indication of tlie form the
draft would assume until the text was laid before the As-
aembly for its ratification. In the popular parlance of
the Aaserably, as they debated the ratification issue, the
draft was referred to as the "oot constitution", a name
which derived its origin frooi the fact that Pierre Cot waa
the rapporteur for the constitutional committee.
At the beginnihg of the debate on the provisions of
the "cot constitution" by the ooamlsaion everyone recognised
that the great defect in the Third Republic's Constitution
was administrative Instability. Even the fifteen study
groups, which during the occupation period had drawn up
plans for the Fourth Republic, sensed that governmental
stability was an esaential pre-requisite. To meet the
challenge the first proposals Included suggestions for &
amall sir.gle chambered parliament of five years duration
advised by a second chamber of experts and technicans.
Such a parliamentary group v»ould have been elected by
universal compuleory suffrage for all over twenty years
of age, under the auspices of parties officially recog-
nized by the State. It *ould have had sole legislative
poter; while the question of the executive power remained
il8-22 votea. See David Thomson, "Building the Fourth ae-
publlc," Contemporary Review . 169:67-68 (February, 1946).
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undecided. It was dociddd, however, that local govorn-
ni«nta would play a more iiaportant role than formorly.
The position of the exocutlve was undocided in the
minds of the planners because they felt the cabinet should
be placed In a position to risk the question of responei-
billty to the Parliament and yet be certain of success v,ith
the support of a perntanont and assured majority. However,
suprossion of ministerial responsibility to the ParlluEisnt
was no solution at the time of grave need on the part of
the I^ench people for strong capable leadership in the new
governirient
,
After much debate in the Conrtituent i.ssombly»8
coiamlssion over the problem, two general principles be-
came Identified with the general intent of the first draft
of the constitution. Theee wero the establishment of social
and political rights for all citizens regardless of sex,
«nd a more decisive political leadership drawn from a
single representative assembly.
The unicameral legislature proved to be the center of
debate in Wie Assembly prior to their ratification of the
"cot constitution." In the past, the Senate had not only
caused cabinets to fall, but by its uncomproiaising attitud*
had brought about conflicts which without the Senate would
never have oeen so bitter between the government and rep-
resentatives of the country. Consequently, In the new draft
text, the iNatlonal Assembly, a single representative chaaiber
was empowered with the chief powers of legislation and ti»
deteraination of policy. During the first half of it«
flva-year term it might te dissolved only oy a resolution
voted by a two-thirds majority of the Deputies. During
the second half of its life dissolution might be pronounced
by Presidential decree following a decision to this effect
by the cabinet, providing the fact that two ministerial
arises had occurred during the same session*
Such concentration of power in one body was partially
modified by the creation of a Council of the French Union,
elected by the Councils of the departments in Metropolitan
Prance and in the territories overseas, which was to
exercise advisory powers over proposed legislation. Ad-
visory power was also to be exercised by an economic counell
the aeiEbershlp of which might be deteriained later by law.
%e final supremacy of the Assembly was assured, how-
ever, by the assignment of essentially honorary functions
to the President who was elected in much the same manner
as under the Third Republic. Me no longer would be author-
ized to appoint the President of the Council of Ministers
because he would nwrely submit the names of various can-
didates to the Assembly. Also the power of pardon was
taken from him and was given to a committee of the judiciary.
He was still permitted to promulgate the laws, but within
a fixed time limit. About all that was left for him to do
was to keeo the records for the Council of •Ministers. Even
the Premier's powers were confined to the execution of the
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la«3. Certain restrictions were Imposed upon the use of
Interpellation and the vote of want of confidence to avoid
the easy means of forcing the resignation of ministeries
which had been possible under the procedures of the old
Chamber of Deputies in the Third Republic.
The second general principle, the rights of man, evi-
denced in the "cot constitution" whittled down, in many
respects, the claims recorded in the fundamental laws of
the Third Republic. The forty diffuse clauses embodying
the claims nwre used as a preamble in an attempt to meet
the demand of the resistance study groups for a new Dec-
laraticm of the Eights of :^^.an based upon the concept that
the people should have every liberty except the liberty
to deny liberty. Besides listing the classic political
and civil rights which had been a part of the French rep-
ublican tradition it also enumerated a number of social
and economic rights. It was in this field of social and
economic guarantees that the interests and privileges of
the individual became subordinated to the State. Sspecially
was this true in regard to property.
^
Other provisions in the draft also attempted to meet
the economic and social demands of the French citizens in
J-A Process of forming a formal question by some member of
^the Chamber and addressing it to a member of the Ministry.
Article 26 of the "cot constitution" provided that economic
monopolies would be nationalized (turned to collective proper-ties /
.
Article 26 stated that every man must be able to acquireproperty by work and saving.
both International and domsstic fields* The clauses relative
to the overseas ^npire ware perhaps the most absurd of all.
Colonial territories were to acquire the right to separate
or remain a part of Prance only by international treaty;
a most tenuous arrangement in the light of fluctuating dip-
lomatic maneuvers. Also the highly experienced and trained
governors of the important colonies were to be removed and
replaced by members of the cabinet who would take up z*es-
idence abroad. But in the local communes and departments
of continental Prance the development of individual init-
iative was encouraged by provisions for wider elections of
representative coioncils with increased powers. This im-
plied a corresponding decrease in central supervision, a
marked change from the traditional pattern.
The conflict between the traditional pattern of govern-
mental procedure and the newly proposed all-powerful assembly
plan became so marked in the Assembly debate that a pol-
itical crisis was precipitated. To deOaulle the new pro-
posals on the ^resident and Premier meant that he would
have the choice under the new Fourth Republic of becoming
a figure-head as President of the Republic, or the leader
of a party who would have to take his chances of being
elected to the Premiership by a majority of the Assembly.
Faced with these alternatives he became convinced that
opposing groups were attempting to eliminate him from the
Fourth Republic, so on January 21, 1946, he abruptly re-
signed as head of the Provisional Oovemment officially
because of continued conflicts over large army expenditures.
Secretly he hoped Prance would again request his services
and offer support to his theory of government.
•Hie resignation left French morale in a state of
emptiness and gloom, and with the realisation that they
would have to wait upon the action of the Assembly to de-
termine their future government. Promptly the Assembly
set out to prove they cwild govern without deGaulle. To
tactfully solve the problem of maintaining the support
of the M.R.P. (deOaulle's party) without Its traditional
leader, Pellx Ooain was offered the headship. He repre»
sented to the bewildered, dlssolusloned Frenchmen a trans-
ition from an exceptional aristocrat with a powerful will
to a man of the people with an Instinctive knowledge of
the ordinary Frenchmen and a mastery of politics.
The first thing this "man of the people" did was to
address the nation revealing the long concealed and des-
perate plight of the economic situation. He appealed to
the people for understanding, support, and cooperation
in his proposed two-fold strategy for economic recovery.
Taxes would have to be Increased and governmental expen-
ditures drastically curtailed to maintain the stability
Of the government. In the meantime, an attempt would be
made to secure a loan from the u. g. ^^ tide Prance over
the immediate difficulties. Teeth were put into the pro-
dl
gram by Andre Philip who was th« chairman of the committe*
of national economy.
In tills spirit of emergency cooperation the Assombly
oted on ratification of the draft of the "cot constitution.
By a vote of 309 to 249 the draft was accepted and it was
submitted in referend\im to the people on May 5, But, a
growing number of Frenchmen viewed with distrust the poor
pz^ogress made by the Assembly and towards the end of its
term were actively restive at being asked to approve a
fraae for the nation's life so hastily thrown together.
numerous arguments against the public adoption of thm
draft were based upon the provisions in the constitution
Itself, some felt that liberty was insufficiently asserted
and that ownership was no longer guaranteed. The main
points of opposition came in the single
-chamber problem
because still the idea of a second chamber to counter
balance the assembly was quite prevalent. Too, the Pres-
Ident was no longer a check on the powers of the Assembly,
nor was the Judiciary which was subordinated to politics.
Revision, the opponents claimed, was too difficult to en-
able the electorate to check the governmental power of
the too-powerful Assembly. As a solution the Provisional
Government should be retained until a better constitution
could be produced.
Supporter, of tho oonstltutlon.l a«ft on th. other
h«.d found oqually o„vinclng r.a.on. for th. adoption «d
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support of the document. They felt It necessary to put
an early end to provisional government and its resultant
instability by accepting a constitution. They admitted
the draft was inadequate in many respects but felt any
constitutional form more stable than none at all. More-
over, it did guarantee certain basic freedoms and protect
the right to exercise them. The National Assembly would
not be hindered in its need for quick action but it would
still be advised by two competent non-legislative councils.
TiM system provided for in the draft insured ministerial
stability, a need strongly felt after the Third Republic
experience. Justice too would no longer be in the hands
of a secluded caste, and the constitution could be revised
by the representatives in the iiational Assembly if the
need presented itself.
Among tha pov.erful political groups supporting the
adoption of the draft perhaps most ardent in their campaign
for acceptance were the Communists. From the beginning
they insisted upon a single chambered, all po«erful as-
sembly which would elect the President. At first this
point of view was maintained because they distrusted
deOaulle's motives in his foreign policy which supported
the idea of western blocs. In foreign policy they felt
Germany to be the key to peace which could be lost if the
U.S.S.R. wer3 excluded. Later they began to feel that
•t
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only a strong assembly would expz*68s the "sovereign will"
of the people. Only control of the judiciary, civil ser-
vants, education, and unity in the trade unions could
assure the necessary strength.
Since liberation the Communists had presented them-
selves to the people as the "great French patriotic party
of the extreme Loft, working to achieve social justice,
which three French Republics have been seeking since the
French Revolution, but at the same time carrying the his-
toric national banner of France and determined to defend
it against any new German agression." Riey professed to
respect not only civil liberties but even private property.
True, they advocated the nationalization of all key in-
dustries and important corporations, but so did the Social-
ists and the Christian Democrats.
The Socialists, too, supported the adoption of the
draft but they disagreed with the Goflarunlsts on the power
of the single-chambered legislature. They opposed the
concept of a second chamber with veto powers over proposals
made from a group elected by universal suffrage, but they
felt an advisory or consultstive chamber of experts and
technicians highly desirable. They were reluctant to sac-
rifice all the powers or prestige of the executive. His
position might be strengthened by direct popular election
or election by a broad electoral grouo including members
of thd Asseiubly aQ<^ delagatlons of &rlous coauBiines and
departments. As a furtiaer counterbalancd, in ti38 case of
a vote of lack of confidence, both the Assembly and the
Government would automatically dissolve. In this fashion
they hoped to avoid the weakness of the Third Republic of
chronic crises and new elections* The members of the
party were determined to check any infringement of the
"sovereign ulll of the majority" or the basic rights of
man. Like the Commtuiists they Telt strength in the rep-
resentative body was the necessary eleoant of protection,
but even though they advocated state control of education,
unity in trade imlon policies, and economic planning they
did not want tl:^ designated executive or judiciary powers
dependent upon the wishes of the all-powerful assembly.
The M.H.P., a strong Catholic party, went much further
than even the Socialists in demanding a stronger executive
In the government. To check the emotions of a newly freed
people they advocated a two chambered legislature and an
annual vote of confidence. If the vote was unfavorable
both the government and the Assembly wuld have to end.
This position was identical with the position taken earlier
by deOaulle in the government crisis which brought hie
resignati<»i. They opposed any Socialist-Communist plan
to favor a larger union typ«j of government which might not
allow freedom In education, property, ownership, and inter-
national collaboration.
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Th« ii.R.P. wanted to carry on the fight for the Rlghta
of Men by adding a new principle of spiritual rebirth.
They felt the Christian principle the best model yet evolved
for human conduct, but they had no Intertion of making the
church a political pov.er. Unlike other leftist groups they
did not oppose the church as such. This opposition on the
part of leftist groups had begun in 1789.
Minor partibs^ ranging frooi those slightly left of
center to the most conservative, generally ¥»ere more favor-
able to the platform of tlia K. K. P. then to a combined
Social Istic-Commtunistic one. They all opposed the all-
powerful single chamber legislative idea as well as con-
trol over foruer basic freedoms. In an attempt to regroup
the established rightist parties the new P.H.L.^ was
formed. It stood on a frankly conservative platform, crit-
icizing in particular the econoatic programs of the three
big parties. I'urther it reasserted its belief that pol-
itical freedom could survive only if property rights and
private enterprise were safeguarded as inuch as possible.
ftixile the rightists wera busy trying to coalesce their
interests, movements were also under way aaong center groupt
under the head of the KasseMblement Hepublicalne fthich
^Republican earty of Liberty
l^adioal l-oclalis'tB'
Democratic Union of Socialist .ieslstance
Independent ;:epublican3' ^""^ ~~
Internationalist Cotimmnlat Party
Social-Democratlo Party
See Kews iJ^om France
. l5;8 (June 6, 1946).
^Partl KepuETIcain dela Liberte.
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tried to acoompliah tix© sano purpose. Both groups hoped
to gain supporters at the expense of the li.R.P* whether
support came from the J4.R,P. or from lukewarm leftists,
there were enough followers of the conservative platfor*
in the country as a whole to reject the referendum by a
oajority of 6,25 percent even with 20 percent of the elec-
torate abstaining.
D»f«at of the refez>endum on the constitution by such
a small percent can be explained in spite of the fact that
o
the docuoent was hastily and poorly done. Sxpectation
had run high during the seven months drafting period that
tne constitution would promote stability; but when the
draft was finally submitted to the people in reftsz^ndum
only a month lapsed for a campaign. Too short a period
of time gave the voter scant opportunity to become familiar
with the provisions or their total implication. An elec-
torate composed of so many novices certainly would be prone
to accept at face value any document handed them, for they
•»• Party vote on the referendum.
Tea t*o
Socialists I^R.pT
Comretmlats Democratic and Social Union
United Movement of French of Resistance
Hobirth Young Republic Movement
National Front Radical Socialists
^'^•'^' Republican oorty for Liberty
League of Right of Man Republican Federation
-Hews Prom France
.
12:2 (May 16, 1943).
2see proposed first draft, available in French iimbassy In-
for?nation Service.
laokad a orltioal spirit engendered by long practice and
experience in weighing political issues. Even those more
familiar with the ropes of politics were confused and be-
wildered by a task of such major proportions and felt per-
haps a poor constitution better than no constitution at
all.
The rejection was unexpected in France and abroad.
Soae felt that such a turn of events meant that the French
were calling a halt to the direction Imposea upon the
French Government by the French Conuounists. They felt
perhaps it was a revolt against some of the salient features
of the proposed constitution: particularly against the
concept of a single chambered legislature, with no system
of checks and counter-checks; and also against a judicature
subservient to the Assembly,^ Certainly acceptance of the
"cot draft" would have aggravated the state of terrible
confusion between the two main functions of the State;
government action and government control. Acceptance,
however, was far removed from the minds of groups of
peasants and women voters who protested a project of a
^Uatholic >orld. 167>fAfi.s /,.»g»..^-^ 1^44). —
World Report
. 26 (November S, 1946).
Andre <^lraud "The ..ew French Constitution," ForeignAffairs
. 25:443 (April, 1947), -^=^=^
John i^ollock, "France and a Constitution," ContemporaryHeview
. 169:326 (June 1946).
^ompura
(Jeorge Slocombe, 'Ib France Swinging to the Kicht "Nation
. 162:591-3 (iSay 18, 1946).
" gn .
Christian Century, 63:613 (May 15, 1946).
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governaiont incapable of meeting the solution of a prircary
economic problem, food.
Following the rejectlcai of tbo project the political
campaign for the new election of assembly maiabers got under
way in earnest. Contrary, however, to general expectations
the caiupaign fight centered not so lauch on the constitution
as on the issue prevalent throughout Surope, the struggle
for power between the left and the right. The ^renon had
no liking for single party rule. The Socialist-Coaiaunist
coalition which would have governed if the draft and new
electoral law had b««n accepted would have too closely re-
sembled a single party to please a nation of individualists.
So, no substantial Increase was given the Communists or
Socialists in the J^ne 1946 elections. In fact the de-
flections from the two part las went to the M.R.P,'^ which
according to traditional standards advocated a program of
advanced radicalism.
In view of the composition of the new Constituent As-
sembly it was certain that no further nationalization would
be decided upon while the constitution would undoubtedly
follow a pattern set by deGaulle. And to form a government
in keeping with the new political line-up proved a dif-
ficult oroblem. The M.R.P. «&• the largest single party
in the Assembly, having polled 6,000,000 votds, so thay
claimed the Premiership. They feared assuming the respon-
^iee chart page S9, '" ' "
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So. of Assembly Gain or Loss
» Seats slnco October *45
Party
MRP (Bldmilt) 160 4l«
Gomntunlst (Thorez) 146 • 3
Socialists (Blum) 115 -15
PHL (Rightists) m 4 2
Radical Union (Harriot) 58
517
f 3
Misc.
Overseas (Uncounted)
S
64
586
Pig. 4. Party alignment following June 1946 election-^
•^Time . 47; 29 (Jnne 10. 1546
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tlblllty howsTer becauaa the Uouu&unists and tho Socialists
rdtaln«d a veto pov/ar ovar the new regime. Together thes«
two parties had polled 9,000,000 votes. The Socialists had
retracted aorae of their platform planks, such as the uni-
cameral legislature, in faror of M.R.P. suggestions, but
the Cttnmunists rezoained firm in their demand for a uni-
ohaabered assembly. To aid their position the Communists
still retained control of the C.Q.T. which meant they
could wreck any recovery progpam with a paralyzing strike.
If the Socialists could be given the position as head of
the government they might become the target for the crit-
icism and discontent of the masses thus enabling the M.R. P.
to reap the benefits of popular favor and to avoid every
issue which might cost it votes. The Social ista xinder
the leadership of George Bidault did assume the Premier-
shio when the Gommvinists eased the 8ituatl(»i by abstaining
from participating in the Assembly's election, and again
work was started for a constitutional draft.
CHAPT^ I?
ACCEPTANCE OP A CONSTITUTION
Following the formation of tha compromise Provisional
Government In June 1946, Andre r*hlllp was placed at the
head of a new orty-two-man constitutional commission.
H« had acted In the same capacity during the drafting of
the "cot constitution" until he was selected to become the
tflnlster of Finance In Febriiary 1946, at the tiue of the
resignation of deQaulle. Vtlth his knowledge of the debate
on the first draft he suggested that the commission begin
its work using the previous committee's minutes. It was
decided that only those articles and sections which had
aroused controversy were to be reopened for consideration.
The other articles would be used verbatim in the new draft.
During its first working sessions the committee under-
took the revision of the controversial articles concerning
the comoosltlon of Parliament and the President of the
Hepublle. The principle of a two-chambered parliament was
adopted after heated debate and a compromise between the
M.R.P. and CowBunists which was Instituted by Vincent
Auriol, the Socialist leader. One chamber of deputies,
known as the Assembly, was to be elected by direct uni-
versal suffrage. A second chamber, known as the Co\uicll
Icomposition of tha constitutional committee:
11 Communists
9 Socialists
12 K.R.P.
2 Radical Socialists
5 Misc.
Hewsweek, 28:40-42 (July 22, 1946).
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of th« Prenoh Republic, was elected Indirectly, partly by
local councils and partly by the Assembly, with greatly
limited powers. The progpam of the M^a,? had called for
a parliament composed of three nouses while the Communists
had favored a uni-chambered plan. The ^^ouncii as a result
of the new aocord had neither the right of veto over leg-
islation proposed by the first chamber, the Assembly, after
a second reading, nor the power to overthrow the government.
It could examine and revise legislation aubmitted to it
by the -i-ssembly during the two month period following its
passage, but any revisions or suggestions were not laan-
datory on the assembly's action. If, however, the agsembly
did reject the Gcainoil's suggest iorr it must be done by
an absolute majority on a publicaly recorded ballot.
Further advice and suggestions could be given tl»
Assembly in its action by two bodies, the i5conomic Council
and the Council of the French Union, which had been created
without BMCh controversy in the first draft. According to
the coalition government's agreement, these two bodies took
the place of the third parliamentary chamber originally ad-
vocated by the M.H.ir*. The l^onomic Oouncll, composed of
representatives of management, labor, government, and the
oon.u«er.,
... to .erve as the guardian of ooonomlc plamilngl
'A»:^oirdr5a"trL"^L"'e'aSSptio°r^^\TL °^ ?°--°-"-^ ^'"'
r^-oir^o^?" •"P-.^^nt''or:ran1 t.l'lilTJ..lT.r'J Sit^SrUX
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while the French Union, composed of 50 percent continental
delegetet and 50 percent overseas delegates meeting in
two houses, was designed to cement the French i^lre into
something comparable with the British Commonwealth of
Nations.
Unlike the British Commonwealth, however, tVanoe
hoped for a president. There were some substantial dif-
ferences betv/een the two constitutional drafts and the
party programs v.ith regard to the powers which the pres*
ident should have, tie still was to be elected, according
to the second draft, in the traditional manner of the
Third Republic for a seven year term, but he would be
eligible for reelection only once. Under the second draft,
he recovered the right to select the Premier, a right whioh
had been danied him by restrictions in the "cot constitution."
The appointment of the presier was, however, subject to
the confirmation of an absolute majority in the Assembly,
but the original choice resided in the President's hands.
The Assembly retained its authority to dissolve itself
with the advice of the Premier daring the first 18 months
of its existence, but the President's influence could be
more directly felt because of the closer contact with the
Premier.
The executive's Influence was to be felt also from
another source, for within the five to ten day period of
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promulgation for l&wi of tha Assembly ha iulght request re-
consideration of tha measures which iiad been passed. Suoh
a request, according to the constitution^ had to be met
by a new vote. If the proposal passed tha second reading
It automatically becax&e a law, but If not, the veto was
effective. Other executive powers such as pardon and par-
ticipation in the Judiciary were restored In part by the
new draft after having been denied completely b/ tna "cot
constitution."
The second draft also modified considerably the first
draft's long recital of basic rights. In preference to
the 40 diffuse clauses in the preamble of the "cot con-
stitution" the new draft merely reaffirmed the declaration
of rights of 1788 and the principles recognized by the
Republic. Then in addition, a few clauses were added which
guaranteed the suggestions of the resistance programs on
equality and stipulated man's social duties and responsi-
bilities. Not only did the constitution make work man-
datory for all i-Tenchmen but it also recogriized the pos-
ition of trade unions, collective bargaining and private
monopolies. Her^ a slight reversal of the "cot constit-
ution's" denial of personal liberties eased the anxiety
of some Frenchmen but still many social controls over former
highly cherished liberties were retained.
Liberty of other peoples was recognized also by con-
atitutional proTialons on condition of reciprocity, but if
in the defense of peace it became necessary to limit
sovereignty provisions were inserted which would allow
Prance the liberty to defend herself or subi&it to the U.H.
or other world organization.
Debate in the Agsembly over the acceptance of the com-
mittee's completed document revealed three facts which
proved to be of significance in the public acceptance or
rejection. First of all, it became evident that in th9
second draft the M.R.P. was resolved, for the sake of
governmental unity and preservation of the coalition govern-
ment until after the referendum, to coo^romiae to the
limit with the Communists on all provisions under question.
Second, the criix of the entire question of acceptance or
rejection centered on the presidential power. And third,
back of the question of presidential position loomed
deGaulle as a point of potential opposition to the insti-
tution of the second draft. If certain powers were denied
the position of President, deOaulle as leader of the M.R.P.
threatened to split the delicate balance in the coalition
government thus throwing the entire program of social,
economic, and political reconstruction into a condition
of chaos. Acceptance depended upon support of the M.R.P.,
a party of increasingly conservative strength as well aa
the Socialists who were not a party to the active compro-
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raising so definitely written into the draft.
On September 29, 1946, only a few hoiirs after the
draft had been accepted, 440«106, by the Assembly, deQaulXe
demanded rejection of the constitution in the forthcoming
public referendum. He objected most strongly to the chief
executive's dwarfed significance, for to him in spite of
appearances the chief-of-it ate was still a mere figurehead,
a situation which could lead only to anarchy and despotism.
Ihat he wanted was a strong government with a strong exe-
cutive elected by the people.
He specifically advocated, in place of the suggested
unicameral system, a oo-existence of two houses of Parlia-
ment. The upper chamber of the dual legislature was to be
corporatistic in character, irepresenting professional and
social groups rather than the electorate in general. Neither
body, the upper or lo?/er chamber, would be entinisted with
the aelectlon of a prime minister but the President was
to be the "arbiter" in the designation of the Government.
He clearly expressed this attitude on September 29, 1946,
when he said:
The chief-of-state should be one man, that la
to say, that he should be chosen and elected really
to represent France and the French Union, that it
should be his task in our divided and threatened
•^Vltal Speeches
. l5;8-9 (October 15^ lQ4fi) .
Henry 'h, Ehrmann, "Uncertainty in Prance," New Reoublic.115:137-8 (August 5, 1946). '
"DeOaulle Tries to Rally France into Anti-Communists
Crusade," y.orld Report
. 11 (May 13, 1947).
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coimtry to Insure the regular functioning of our
institutions above all parties and to further the
permanent interests of the Nation without regard
for any political contingencies.^
He further emphasized his position by advocating the com-
plete separation of the three powers of ths State, legis*
latlve, executive, and judicial with clearly defined and
full responsibilities in Its own domain,
'^e position of deGaulle and his party, vAiich was dlr<
ected towards bx*eaklng the compromises among the parties,
was perhaps a factor in the trend of the vote which sub-
mitted the controversial document in referendum to the
people. The supporters knew that at best the draft would
probably be accepted, but they hoped that it would be
passed by only a small percent so that a campaign for re-
vision could be launched immediately. Approval for the
draft came as only 54 percent of the electorate indicated
their attitude. Of the 36 percent abstaining the majority
were members of deOaulle's A1,R.P.2 Even though the coali-
tion was not broken the policy of deGaulle emerged at
still the largest single influence in France.
DeGaulle 's position, however, was not the only factor
Involved in the small vote of support for the plan which
leaders hoped might start Prance on the straight road to
recovery. It was the vacillation in the views of all
^yital Speeches
. 15; tf t October 1^^ 1<^^^\
.
gWorld Heport
. 26 (November 5, 1946).
Bewsweek
. 28:55 (October
€1, 1946).
Time
.
48; 54 I October 21, 1946),
leaders and parties the people had formerly trusted which
caused many voters to refrain from casting a ballot rather
than indicate some program which might suddenly reverse
-
.a
itself. The method of voting under the principle of pro-
portional representaticai was itself so confusing that it
discouraged intelligent people and invalidated many votes
that were cast in good faith. Also vast nximbers of people
had no real knowledge of the nattire of the new constitution
for they had been too occupied with personal problems of
reconstruction and readjustment following the war to pay
attention to the subtle ramifications in the short spaes
of time allotted for consideration of the issues* In
fact, tri-partism in politics and power revealed so much
bickering, delay, and intrigue and so few material re-
sults that the average Frenchman felt nothing but disgust.
This attitude he manifested by lukewarm support of the
constitution because he was impatient for economic reform,
or open demand for Immediate revision in support of deOaulle's
demands*
Th.e constitution was promulgated, according to Article
106, by the President of the Provisional Government two days
after the proclamation of the results of the referendum.
It took some time, however, to publish the proclamation which
consisted of the official returns^ and then the National
iln order to acquire official referendum returns it was nec-
essary for each Prefecture to collect the authenticated re-
cord of ballots received In each polling station. Then the
Departmental Polling ComEaittee compiled the records from the
Prefectures and forwarded the results in the form of a sworn
statement to the Prefect at the ministry of Interior. The
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Assombly oloctl(»ia v»ei»« held* Tlie document went Into
effect, according to Article 98, on the third Tuesday fol-
lowing the election of the meiubors of tba Council of the
Republic,
Revision became the central and immediate issue in
the election campaign. Fortunately the document was
flexible enough that revision, even by Parliament with-
out a popular referendum might not completely invalidate
all the work done by the framers who attempted to express
the demands of the people*
overseas territory sent in their oi-ficial count by cable,"Ahen the Kational Committee for the referendum compiled
the final returns *hich were "proclaimed" by the Minister
of the Interior by a siasple ooiamunique published in theJournal off iciel .
Kews From France
. 33:4 (October 24, 1946).
CHAPTER V
PUTTING THE COKSTITUTION INTO OPERATIQB
Following a tens* campaign involTlng questiona of
world-wide significance, on KoTember 10, 1946, 78 percent
of the Krench electorate again went to the polls* The
politloal direction which Prance might assume would un-
doubtedly influence economic developments in a number of
world spheres of influence. Surprisingly, in spite of
sose notable changes, there were no sharp swings either
left or right in political sentiments. The Communists
gained 20 seats over those acquired in the June 1946 elec-
tions, while the Socialists were relieved of 27 seats.
This n»ant that nearly 29 percent of the total popular
vote had gone to the Communist s-'- giving them a 170-161
lead over the M.R.P.s.
Communism as a doctrine, however, had not captured
the popular imagination of the French, rather Communist
leaders both Inside and outside the cabinet of the Pro-
visional Oovernment were merely helping to put into action
some of the theories previously advocated but subsequently
discarded by the Socialists. They were determined and
efficient in reconverting the Ration's economy to peace-
'^n7^°!^J"« received 6,i>00,000 votes in June 1946, and
registered.
''°^*'^^*** ^^^^' '^'^^ ^^^^^ *«re only 1,000,000
Ernest J Knapton, "The Fourth French Kepubllc."Current History
. 10:125 (February, 1947). '
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tine needs. A program such as they followed would have
been considered treasonable In Russia. Especially would
It have been so in the light of the policy of the French
branch of the party in i^gard to sanction of private pi»operty
and the formatiai of profit-sharing co-opertitives. As such
an institution the Communists gained popular support oyer
the M.R. P.s and the Socialists*
Both the S.R.P.s and the Socialists lost about 500,000
votes to the new left, the Commtmists, between the June
and November 1946 elections. The M.R, P. which had had a
phenomenal rise as a Catholic party devoted to social re-
form formerly had had the blessing of deOaulle, but it
lost that as the party members indicated their willingness
to accept the second draft constitution. Their program
alcmg with that of the new Rasseabloment deg Gauches
.
which
included elements of the Radical Socialists, was not far-
sighted enough to win popular majorities comparable with
those in the June election, llae Socialists, too, lost
their support because the party Itself reverted to a pos-
ition only slightly left of center. This shift was re-
pulsive to some of the staunch supporters, who in prefer-
ence to sacrificing their old viewpoints, cast their lot
with the Coumunlsts. In this situation the Socialists
placed greater emphasis upon Individual liberties in pre-
ference to the more complex socially controlled state ad-
vocated by the Communists.
Following the adoption of the constitution and the At-
sembly elect! ens, the Comnamists began to bargain for as
much power as possible in the new cabinet. At the largest
single perty they offered Maurice Thore« as their candidate
for the preraiership. They Indicated a willingness to
join with the Socialists in forming a government, but
they were xmcompromislng in their refusal to work with the
M,R. P. In consequence Thoroz was defeated by a vote of
259 to 314.1 .^^ M,R.P, ioaediately offered an alternative
by suggesting that George Bidault, who was then head of
the Provisional Government, and his coalition govei*nment
be retained as an interim regime until the President of
the Republic could be elected in January, v.ith the Com-
munists leading the opposition however he was defeated by
a vote of 240-361,
In this deadlock i-eon Blum reluctantly agreed to at-
tempt the formation of an interim coalition government.
Previously he had refused to act in such a capacity pri-
marily because of his age, 74 years, and the fact that his
party had won only one-sixth of the seats in the election.
Also he hesitated to serve after two terms as premier in
the Third Republic under a constitution destined to oe
opposed by a figure as powerful as deGaulle. Once in a
position to act again, however, he at first attempted to
draw up a government coaiposed of Socialists, Comaiunigts,
Tjbid
. . Igg. — —
-
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Radicals, Independent Republicans, and M.R.P.s, By an
overrhelmlng vote of 675-55 he wae authorized to proceed*
But the mutual mistrust of the various parties tsade his
first plan xinsucceasful because the Radicals and affiliates
refused to join a government which did not Include repre-
sentatives of the Rightists, while the Gomrnunists refused
to participate in one which did. Abandoning the attempt
to effect a compromise, he appeared before the Agsembly
on Deceraber 17, 1946, to propose an all-Socialist cabinet
in which he would assume the role of President-premier
and retain the portfolio of foreign affairs. With 69
members abstaining from voting the list was accepted 544-2
because the other parties felt the Socialists could then
be forced to aasui]» the responsibility for the lonpleasant
econoscic measures so necessary for reconstruction and re-
habilltation.
Ifl»ediately the government launched a campaign to cut
prices drastically by ordering a reductlcai of five peroont
in virtually all prioes in canmerce, industry, wid agri-
culture. The program was btsed on a conviction that spec-
ulation and hoarding could not be stopped until prioes
were forced downward. The government leaders felt that
inflation had not been caused by a shortage of goods or
an oversupply of money in circulation. Rather, they felt
that prises had been climbing because speculators, big and
aaall, had been holding quantities of goods off the market
76
in the hopd of biggor profits. "Hie goverruaent plan waa
designad to force goods onto the jaarkat. Still additional
funds were needed to purohaae grain, iaaohinary, and raw
aaterials for export leads, whloh oould come only from
loans by the O.S»
The U.S., howevor, was reluctant to grant the loans
In the faoe of the increased oosltion of the ComHunista.
The Comaunists themselves sensed the fact that their sup-
port by auasla waa a retarding factor in many phases of
French recovery. It waa primarily that approach which the
weaker allies and the enemies of the Goaununlst sponsored
prograiB used to tip the scales of popular favor against
them. This was even the more disastrous when It is re-
called that the party had just reached a new high In par-
llaoentary oower which might ultlrr.ately lead to leadership
,
such as the premiership or the la^esidency. In addition to
significant influence in all French policy as It was car-
ried out under the provi^^lons in the new ocmstitutlon.
But, their errors were capitalized upon by their enemies
to such an extent that they were not a serious threat In
the actual election of the President of the Hepubllc.
The constitution itself contained no specific pro-
visions on th« manner in .diich the President was to be
elected, or what constituted a sufficient affirmative vote
to make the election effective. Finally, after a i^st
minute session of the chairman of the various party group.
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In both tha Asaembly and the Coiincll an acceptable method
of procedure was agreed upon. In complianoe with tha plan,
on January 16, 1947, both houses met In joint session and
by secret ballot Indicated their choice for president.
Solid support from the Communists and Socialists enabled
Vincent Auriol, the "old guard" Socialist chairman of the
Assembly, to win 452 of the 883 votes caat.^ The M.R.P,
had supported Auguste Chanpetler de aihes, the new pres-
ident of tha Council. The vote was more than the neces-
sary absolute majority which tlie party heads had decided
would be necessary to elect a president.
President Auriol who had bean installed at once im-
mediately accepted the resignation of tha Provisional
govemiEent's Pramier, Leon Blum, and his all-Socialist
cabinet. In his place Auriol commissioned Paul Hamadler,
also a Socialist, to form a government under the new con-
stitution. Ramadier selected a cabinet to present to
Auriol and the Parliament on January 22, 1947, which com-
blnad a wide coalition of party groups based on a central
nucleus of Socialists who would retain control of the most
important economic positions. Largely because of his ability
to accept challenges the premier was able to rorm a govern-
ment «hlch not only represented popular French opinion
but one also capable of ramainlng in taat in the face of
^ibid.. 127:— — — ~
International Conciliatior> Pgp»r., ne (February, 1947).
political disputes v»hioh would undcxibtedly b© the order
of the day as tho goTsmwent began to function. Such
problams as the strengthening of mild deflationary measuroa,
socialization of industry, curbing a vlgopous foreign pol-
icy, and the nature of French society iiitenaified by deter-
mined political propaganda and idealogical conflicts, did
not cast a very roseate hua to the picture of ccmditions
as the Fourth Hepublic faced the future,
•Die most striking general characteristic of the newly
established Fourth .iepubiic was its siiarp resemblence to
its immediate predecessor, the Tiiird Republic. The basic
charters, in addition to the men at the head of the govern-
»ent and their methods, of the two republics were moat
similar. To many Frenchmen this was indeed a disappoint-
ment because the main hope of the young leaders of tho re-
sistance had been one of the national reniaasance and re-
noratlon. But the resistance had been unable to assert
itself during a period of destruction, l-he three main
parties holding four-fifths of the seats in the new Aaoeiably
were composed to a large extent of inferior men, without
personality or clear opinions who were picked for their doc-
ility. Such a situation was due in large extent to the system
of proportional repi-esentation provided for in the electoral
law of August 17, 1945^ which permitted tho party leader,
iHaaadler in giving the weak Luti Republican Rally equality
with the powerful Coauounists and M.tt.P. porforaied a brilliantbut precarious feat of jugglery.
Nation
.
164:113 (February 1, 1947).
*Se« Appendix A.
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caucus, said machine to designate whomever they wished as
deputies and councillors.
In spite of the weakness of parliamentary members,
unity of the three parties on such issues as economic re-
covery enabled Pranoh to make some progress. The Coai-.
munists who controlled the C.G.T. kept strikes down to a
minimum during the first months of the Fourth Hepublic.
This made possible enough political stability for a
French representative in tlie United States to attempt to
negotiate a loan, and a representative at the Moscovi con-
ference of Foreign ministers to secxire a British, U.S.,
and German oro:i:ise to give France more German coal.
Additional plans for recovery worked out by Jean
Monnet,-*- however, were slow to get into full operation.
As the recovery lagged political tempers grew short. The
truce among the political parties, none of them strong
enough to rule Frarice alone, wore so thin that deGaulle
felt the time ripe to reappear on the political scene.
This he did by launching & ne?/ political party, the Has-
•l-^me ?^onr-et '-'Ian consisted of eleven volumes o^ v ords and
statistics, containing the moat comprehersivo surveys ever
made of French economy, plus detailed projects for produc-tion and investment in the country »s main industries. Forthe six basic industries - coal, steel, electricity, cement,
agricultural machinary, and transpbrt - it lay dow soecifloprograms for the years 1947 through 1950. It scheduledthe export p and imports which would be needed to sustain
such programs, and then estimated the trend in the balanceOf paymonts and the amount of foreign borrowing required.
It also included separate reports on manpower and livestock,in their relation to the r^st of the country's economicdevelopment. '
Michael L. Hoffman, "The Best Things In France Today."harpers
. 2:261 (September, 1947).
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Bomblaaqnt du PouoIq T^rancals ,^ which opooaod avarything
the FoTirth Hapubllo had attempted since Its inception wltii
th« exception of the lipnnot i:*lan. Such an organization
and program posed additional problems of Belf-proaervaticn
for the new Fourth Republic as it faced an even more dif-
ficult period in its mattiration process.^
i reunion of the x-'rench i^eoole, it.i^g; ~
ZSee Appondix C for Chronological order of the Development
of the I'ourth Republic. t'-wxiv
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APPENDIX
ippdndix k
Provisions of the Ordinance of August 17, 1945*
Electoral lifts :
^aoh party or indepondant group presents Its list
of ctrdldhtes In tha depertaents or depsrtaent of Its oholoe*
This lint contains a nusber of names equalling tibe total
nusber of registered votex*a of the said departments mimn
divided by 42,000.
hatior.al quotlei-tt ;
After final voting returns are In, the quotient,
or somber of votes needed to secure a seat, will be ueber*
ailned by dividing the total number of ballots by 579 (number
of seats In the Assembly). In eaeh department eaoh oarty
vill receive as many seats as It had obtained quotients*
Prii.Rry PrfeCtional Rerealnders ;
A section of the '^^nlstry of the Interior \.ill
add the remainders obtained by each party In all depart-
tcents, thus obtaining a new number of votes to be divided
by the 'tiuotient* . The number of addltlcmal seats attri-
buted to each party will be equal to the luaaber of tines
the quotient Is contained In the total of its fraotional
remainders. As the distribution of seats will be deter*
ained on a national instead of a depart^nental basis they
will be allotted according to the following procedure; the
percentage of remainders for eaeh department will be deter*
iced in proportion to the total nuaber of votes for each
list In each departniant. The deoartjaants having the highest
percentages of fractional remainders will be given addition*
el seats to be filled frots the departaeutal lists.
SecondaryJ^eaalnders ;
'ny fractional remainders after the first division
will be subject to redistribution, by applying the systea
of the "highest average." According to this procedure
the total nu:aber of votes (for eaoh party llsti will be
divided by the nui^er of its eleoted deputies, plus one.
The party with the hl^est average will be given a seat.
This i>rocedur3 will be continued until all available seats
luive been filled.
Parties not receiving 5:< of the national vote
will not bs entitled to redistribution of remainders.
Dftparttaents receiving a nuaber of votes divisible
by the quotient will be attributed two a»ats on the priaarj
reaainder.
ill
Appendix B
tooaapllshBents of the Conatitaent ^aa^ably
(•xelu8lT« oi the first draft of tltw Constitution}
£>«tionallsRtlont
2. budg«t oounoll oreatod
.J. gaa and olsctrloity
4. iasurase*
&• coal Blnlng
Social lavs:
!• k'lner status
£• overt iroe pay rates in sal&rlaa
3* Olii ^vg« pensions
4. total relRbursament for war daaa^*
6* •mployse representat!•, if csore than 10 eaploysss
AdainistratlTe Reforms:
1» suprecslon of hegional organ ieras
2. supression of Vloby orgtmixed ooaoiittees
Agriculture
:
1« faxMalng and ehara-crcoping statutes
S* Qdnvarsion of oactonai and district parity co«»
Bisslonere into parity tribocals with elected assessors*
d* Buppresseu corporate agricultural organisations
of Vichy
4. CooperstlTfts organised
Overseas
:
!• departmental status to some territories
2. forced labor suppz>esaed
5« citiaenshlp to all aea^ers of the Unictt
4* local elected assemblies
EconcMiios:
1* olTil and ffiilitary eeononiee
£• taxes increased to gradually liquidate goTenueent
subsidies
Sleetoral Law:
IT
Appendix C
Oironologlcal Jovslopxent of tho Fourth Rspablie
JVM 10, 1940 - i^llltary collapse to Oeroaay
June, 1940 - Matlcmal Assembly gave gorerRiuBtal power
to Marshall Petain in Vichy
1941 * 1943 • Organization of the F»F*Z.
July 14, 1943 • DeOaulle proolalaed the C.K.L* and pro*
aised a future Fourth itepublle*
August, 1943 - C.N.L. glTen tentative reoog&ltion In
Quebeo Conference*
June, 1944 - military Invasion by Allies, Allied of-
ficials assuae civil resaonsibilitlos*
OetotMr 25, 1944-' Allies give offlolal recognition to
doOaulle*s iProvlsional Oovemment*
December 10, 1944-Russia signs a t««rity-year Military Al-
liance
April 29, 1945 - Kleotlona for local officials.
Say 13,
Sept«»ber 23-29
,
1945 - Deportsental elections*
October 21, 194S -Constituent Assefflbly Election plxis dual
referenduut on interiia govarnaect.
Xay 5, 1946 • Heferendtus oa '^oot constitution**
Jvaam 2, 1946 - Second Constituent Asseiahly election.
October 13, 1946- Keferenduis on second draft constitution
accepted.
loveaber 10, 1946-^atlonal Asseably Election.
Xeveaber £4, 1946-Sleotlons for Council electors eoapleted.
Oeeoad>er 17, 1946-Iieon BIub appointed Presier
January 16, 1947 -Vincent nuriol elected President of the
Bepublio.
